Volume 23
Issue 2 Spring 1983
Spring 1983

Efficiency and Equity Implications of Alternative Well Interference
Policies in Semi-Arid Regions
Edward D. Lotterman
John J. Waelti

Recommended Citation
Edward D. Lotterman & John J. Waelti, Efficiency and Equity Implications of Alternative Well Interference
Policies in Semi-Arid Regions, 23 Nat. Resources J. 323 (1983).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol23/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

Edward D. Lotterman* and John J. Waelti**

Efficiency and Equity Implications of
Alternative Well Interference Policies
in Semi-Arid Regionst
INTRODUCTION

During the 1970s, well interference emerged as a highly volatile policy
issue in the allocation of groundwater in states bordering the humid East
and the arid West. Well interference is the lowering of water levels of
wells near a high capacity well during and shortly after the period in
which the high capacity well is being pumped. It is generally a temporary
hydraulic phenomenon, as distinguished from long term overall lowering
of the water level in an aquifer caused by pumping which exceeds recharge.
States such as Iowa, Minnesota, and South Dakota, which border on
humid and arid regions, have experienced dramatically increased groundwater irrigation in the last decade. Although the actual number of well
interference cases in these states has been relatively small, and aggregate
economic damages thus far appear to have been minor, the political impact
has been significant. The problem has thus become a major factor in
shaping the future course of groundwater policy in these states.
The political impact of the problem has resulted largely from widespread public unease about the adequacy of water supplies during the
drought period of 1974-76. Most of the conflicts during that period arose
from new irrigation wells interfering with existing domestic wells. The
drought, combined with rapidly increasing use of groundwater for irrigation, caused all three states to review and, to some extent, revise their
groundwater allocation policies. Most of the revised rules have emerged
since the easing of the drought, and have not been subject to the degree
of public scrutiny which would have been likely a few years before. Nor
have those rules been tested to any great extent either in actual practice
or through litigation. Thus, an examination of these policies in light of
their likely economic effects is appropriate. Specifically, this article will
*Instructor, Department of Business and Economics, Dordt College; formerly Research Assistant,
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota.
**Professor, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota.
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the Water Resources Research Act of 1964 (P8-379), Project No. USDI OWRT-14-34-0001-8412,
"Evaluation of Legal and Institutional Arrangements Associated With Groundwater Allocation in
the Missouri River Basin States."

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 23

examine efficiency and equity implications of the well interference policies of South Dakota, Iowa, and Minnesota, as a means to derive criteria
for a rational policy to deal with well interference in semi-arid states.
CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF WELL INTERFERENCE IN
SEMI-ARID REGIONS
There are several physical, economic, and social reasons why well
interference is a greater problem in "border" states than in the more arid
West. Natural precipitation is greater in the border states, and
evapotranspiration' is generally lower, making traditional non-irrigated
agriculture a much more viable alternative to irrigation than is usually
the case in the West. Irrigation is of a supplemental nature in the border
states. Usual water applications are less than 12 inches per year. A relatively small percentage of farmers irrigate, and the practice of irrigation
is not regarded with the same degree of legitimacy as in the West.
Hydrological differences also exist between the border states and their
Western neighbors. Western aquifers tend to be large, thick outwash
formations of relatively uniform composition. Aquifers in the states of
Iowa, Minnesota, and South Dakota are often relatively small formations
located in a jumble of glacial till material. They are frequently severely
limited in area and thickness, and may vary widely in transmissivity 2 and
other characteristics within a very short distance. While many of these
aquifers can produce wells with sufficient yields for irrigation, and may
receive enough recharge to support such use, the physical characteristics
in some are such that severe well interference, or other short term drawdown problems, may result from use for irrigation. In addition, population
density is usually higher in border states than in the West, and thus the
distances between irrigation wells and neighboring wells are often shorter.
In these border states interfering wells are nearly always irrigation
wells. Affected wells are normally used for domestic supply and livestock
watering. Serious problems ordinarily occur only when the affected well
dries out completely or suffers reduced yield for some period of time.
Cases may arise where well interference results in no change in yield,
but does create higher pumping costs for the affected well. However,
total quantities pumped are usually so low that the increased costs are
insignificant. In contrast, the value of the output of water produced by
the affected wells is usually high. Moreover, economic losses from well
interference are seldom limited to foregone production. Costs may arise
from other damage such as burned out pump motors and health or pro1. Evapotranspiration is the total water loss from the soil, including that by direct evaporation
and that by transpiration from the surfaces of plants.
2. Transmissivity is the ease with which water is transmitted or moves through the aquifer.
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duction losses to livestock. For example, dairy cows forced to go without
water for relatively short periods early in their lactation may suffer from
decreased production for the rest of the lactation period.
Well Interference as an Externality
Well interference is a classic example of an economic externality of
production, that is, an activity of one economic unit that unintentionally
affects the utility or well-being of another. When the pumping of a high
capacity well, such as an irrigation well, causes interference with neighboring wells, the owners of those neighboring wells incur costs that they
would not have incurred if the high capacity well had not been used.
These costs may include higher energy expenditures as the result of
pumping from a greater depth, the cost of installing a new pump or
constructing a new and deeper well, or health and production losses of
livestock (as described above).
Well interference as an externality has both equity and efficiency effects.
An efficiency gain to society results insofar as the value of the marginal
product 3 exceeds the marginal social cost of pumping the water. However,
beyond a certain point an efficiency loss results because the irrigator using
the high capacity well does not bear all the costs to society of pumping.
The irrigator has incentive to pump more than is optimal from a resource
efficiency standpoint. The supra-optimal or excess use of resources results
in a dead weight loss to society. 4
The equity effect is that the irrigator gains the value of the marginal
product of the water. A portion of that gain is at the expense of the owner
of the existing neighboring well who bears higher pumping costs and
perhaps experiences temporary water shortages.
The efficiency and equity effects can be illustrated with a simple graphic
model as set forth in Figure 1. In this model the producer faces two
ecodomic parameters. One such parameter is his marginal cost of pumping
water, MCP, which is determined by fuels and other variable costs and
is nearly horizontal within the relevant range. The producer also faces a
value of marginal product curve, VMP. For many activities which use
water, particularly agricultural irrigation, the value of marginal product
is a decreasing function which may decline to zero or even become
negative as more water is applied to a fixed area of land .5
3. The value of the marginal product can be expressed as VMP = (total input
revenue ) or altematively, marginal physical product (

) multiplied

by the price of the product.

4. A dead weight loss is one for which there is a loss to one or more parties, but for which there
are no offsetting gains to others in the economy.
5. The VMP Curve declines because of the law of diminishing returns. That is, as more variable
input (water in this case) is added, marginal physical product declines (see supra note 3).
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As a rational profit maximizer, the producer pumps until the value
produced by the last unit of water he uses is equal to the cost of pumping
that water. In Figure 1 that quantity of water is q. The producer realizes
a surplus of value produced over costs equal to the triangular area acd.
Unfortunately, costs to society are not limited to those incurred by the
producer for pumping. The external costs of well interference, when added
to producers' pumping costs, form the costs to society as a whole which
rise rapidly at higher levels of pumping. The marginal costs to society
at each level of water use are represented by the curve MC,. The marginal
cost of well interference at any point is the vertical distance between MCP
and MC,.
The model reveals that part of the producer's surplus acd is in fact an
income transfer from persons affected by well interference. The amount
of this transfer is equal to the area of triangle ace, which is made up of
triangles abe and bce. Triangle abe represents the pure equity effect of
well interference.
It is efficient to pump to at least point q2 because VMP > MCs.
However, the difference between MC, and MCP represents a transfer from
the neighbor to the irrigator.
The remaining portion of the transfer, bce, has both equity and efficiency implications. From the point of view of society as a whole, the
optimum level of water use does not occur at q1 , but rather at q 2 , where
the VMP is equal to marginal cost to society rather than marginal cost
to the producer. Producing at level q, rather than at q 2 has two effectsa transfer from society (or in this case from neighbors) to the producer
equal to triangle bce, and a dead weight loss equal to triangle cfe. Triangles
bce and cfe represent the efficiency effect of well interference.
In this model the difference between the producer's marginal cost,
MCP, and the marginal cost to society, MC,, consists of the additional
cost of pumping water in affected wells and the damages caused by
temporary water shortages during one pumping season. In the long run,
owners of neighboring domestic wells may reduce or eliminate these costs
by constructing new and/or deeper wells. Such action might shift the
seasonal marginal cost to society downward to MC,, and would allow
the producer to continue to pump q, units of water without causing
appreciable transfers or losses. This solution would be preferable for
society if the cost of the new wells were less than the present value of
the external costs represented by area ace, assuming that pumping in the
absence of new wells were restricted by rules or administrative procedures
to q2. Under this condition, triangle abe represents external costs which
no longer occur because of the new wells which relieve interference
problems. Triangle bce represents additional product enabled by increasing pumping from q2 to q.
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In the absence of regulations designed to restrict pumping to level q2,
pumping would normally occur to point qt. New investment, which would
shift MC, to M s, would be efficient if the costs of the new wells were
less than the present value of area acf in future years. Area ace represents
the value of the additional product, and cef represents the dead weight
loss which no longer occurs.
Based on these equity and efficiency characteristics of well interference,
one can derive several criteria by which to evaluate specific well interference policies. With respect to efficient resource allocation, laws and
administrative regulations should minimize dead weight losses to society
while enabling real income gains that may result from high capactiy
pumping. With respect to equitable considerations, laws, rules and regulations, in our view, should recognize the income transfers which may
occur under high capacity pumping, and depending on the value judgments of society, should reduce or compensate for such income transfers.
In his classic article, Coase argues that externalities can be efficiently
handled through the marketplace. 6 However, we take a less sanguine
view, more in line with Mishan's theory that the "structure"of the market
and resulting high transactions costs more often than not preclude efficient
handling of externalities in the marketplace. 7 As pointed out later in this
article, public policy may facilitate or provide means for encouraging the
private negotiation of externalities. In most situations, however, this facilitation will require affirmative public policy action rather than a policy
of benign neglect.
Equity considerations have implications for efficiency concerns since
failure to provide for compensation may prevent irrigation benefits from
accruing.' Finally, policies and procedures that are adopted should not
result in equity or efficiency effects that are as or more costly to society
than the problems which they are intended to alleviate. For example,
cumbersome administrative procedures and/or litigation are real costs to
society. Furthermore, procedures which involve litigation tend to favor
high income individuals who already enjoy favored status in society. With
this background, we now turn to an analysis of specific state policies of
Minnesota, South Dakota, and Iowa.
ANALYSIS OF STATE POLICIES
1. Minnesota
Groundwater use in Minnesota is regulated by the state's Department
of Natural Resources (DNR). Well interference is a high visibility issue,
6. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, III J. L. & ECON. 1 (Oct. 1960).
7. Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities:An Interpretive Essay, Vol. IX, No. 1, J.
ECON. LrrEPtAuRl
1-27 (March 1971).
8. Potential benefits from irrigation would be precluded, for example, if a moratorium were placed
on new irrigation permits.
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as evidenced by the fact that about 20 percent of DNR's rules governing
water appropriation concern procedures to avoid or abate the problem of
well interference.
Minnesota's policy appears to be to force large users to provide compensation for any damages caused by their pumping. The pumper "shall
be responsible for all costs necessary to provide an adequate supply with
the quality and quantity as prior to the applicant's or permittee's interference. "I
Applicants for a permit to pump groundwater for irrigation are required
to submit detailed information about the site of their planned well. If
DNR lacks "adequate" information on the aquifer involved from which
to estimate drawdown and the effect on existing wells, an aquifer test
must be conducted. This test consists of pumping the well for at least 24
hours while observing drawdown and subsequent recovery in one or more
observation wells. 10
The information produced from the test is used in a computer analysis
to predict interference effects in nearby wells. If it appears likely that
one or more neighbors will be deprived of water at any period of time,
the DNR may not issue the permit until the applicant reaches an agreement
with all affected parties detailing the abatement procedures or compensation which the applicant will offer to the potentially damaged party. II
After the permit to appropriate water is issued, any party who realizes
changes presumably caused by the new irrigator can register a complaint
to the DNR. The DNR is required to investigate all complaints. If a
complaint is substantiated, the DNR is required to restrict or suspend the
permit until the permittee reaches an agreement with the affected parties. 12
How does Minnesota's policy rate with respect to the criteria for efficiency and equity described above? Because the irrigator is forced to
compensate neighbors for damages to their wells, the irrigator effectively
faces the maximum cost to society, that is, the MC, curve illustrated in
Figure 1. 3 Thus, the irrigator has the incentive to operate at q2 , in Figure
1, and the dead weight loss to society is likely to be minimal. Further,
the gains to society resulting from increased real product from irrigation
are allowed to accrue insofar as provision is made for the irrigator to
negotiate with neighboring well owners regarding compensation. With
9. 6 MINN. CODE AGENCY R. (hereafter cited as MCAR) §1.5054 D (1)a (1980).
10. MINN. STAT. §106.416 (1977); 6 MCAR §1.5053 A.l.b.(b) (1980).
11. 6 MCAR § 1.5054 A.5. (b) (1980).
12. Id., § 1.5054 B.4.
13. The conclusion that the pumping costs plus damages to neighbors through well interference
equals the full costs to society which are faced by the irrigator is subject to the qualification that
there are no additional costs such as damages to wetlands, which reach beyond the irrigator and
neighbors suffering well interference.
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respect to equity, the irrigator is forced to absorb the cost represented by
the area abe in Figure 1, and no transfers will occur.
Another advantage of the policy, regarding both efficiency and equity,
is that the usually difficult task of estimating marginal costs is left to be
resolved by the affected parties on the basis of approximately equal bargaining power. Parties in the bargaining process are prevented from exercising monopoly or veto power by a provision which allows appeal to
impartial arbitration by any party who feels his/her opponents are unreasonable. I4 This provision is an example of administrative regulation fostering constructive private negotiation with minimal transactions cost.
Minnesota's policy might be questioned on the basis of administrative
cost. As the ultimate result of that policy-i.e., liability on the part of
the water user with negotiated compensation-remains constant, one can
question the justification of the time consuming and expensive permit
application and evaluation process. The current practice does little to
reduce any uncertainty on the part of the producer. The water user must
incur most of his ultimate investment costs as part of the application
process, and issuance of a permit is no guarantee that subsequent problems
will not result in restriction or suspension of that permit. However, the
pumping test arguably permits the affected parties and the DNR to anticipate problems which may later arise. Furthermore, transactions costs
associated with the permit application process are much less than those
which would result from litigation in the courts at a later time.
One can argue that the aquifer test requirement has some external
benefit to society in that it generates information which will reduce uncertainty for future potential water users. However, the same information
could be generated over time by systematic lower-cost data collection
during normal use of the well. Furthermore, requiring initial developers
to bear all the costs of generating information from which later developers
will benefit tends to discourage such initial development. This result is
a variant of classic questions arising in the area of copyrights and patents.
The resulting disincentive to development could cause efficiency losses
equal to the value of foregone production.
2. South Dakota
South Dakota's procedures are similar in some respects to those of
Minnesota.' 5 Applicants for high capacity well permits are required to
submit information about the location and the geologic characteristics of
their proposed wells to the Department of Natural Resources Development
14. 6 MCAR §1.5054 D (1980).
15. 13 S.D. COMP. LAWS Tit. 46, Chapters 1-6, 10.
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(DNRD). DNRD staff members evaluate the application on several grounds,
including the likelihood of well interference, and then recommend to the
state Water Rights Commission (WRC) whether to approve or disapprove
the application. The hydrological information required and analyses made
are not as detailed as in Minnesota. However, the body of existing hydrological information is greater in South Dakota than in Minnesota, and
thus provides a rationale for not requiring as much hydrological detail
from applicants.
If it appears that a domestic well will be interfered with, and that well
is considered "adequate," the Commission will not approve the application. The key question is what constitutes an adequate well. While
Minnesota protects all existing wells, South Dakota protects only those
wells that meet standards of adequacy. Generally, an adequate well must
fully penetrate the aquifer' 6 and have its pump set just above the screen.
Many existing wells do not meet these standards since the statutory requirements are in excess of what would be needed to construct an adequate
well in the absence of irrigation. Water wells typically have long lives,
and most existing domestic wells were constructed before the development
of large scale groundwater irrigation. There is no "grandfather" clause
to protect such wells, although they were considered adequate when they
were constructed.
If the affected well does not meet the adequacy standards, the owner
of that well receives no protection and must bear all the costs of the
interference. If the well is determined to be adequate, the Commission
will not issue a permit and the applicant for the high capacity well has
no recourse. If the applicant is able to reach an agreement with the affected
party, the WRC may issue the permit. However, no state agency is authorized to encourage or require such a bargaining process. The domestic
well owner holds a near absolute veto power. If he is not satisfied with
any offer of compensation, the high capacity well owner will not receive
a permit. Similar procedures are followed in cases of interference that
are not predicted during the permit application process, but which materialize later. Since South Dakota policies generally allow, and may even
require, that the high capacity well be constructed before the permit is
issued, the applicant who does not receive a permit may suffer a substantial
financial loss by not having any opportunity to recover his investment
which is literally a "sunk cost."
How does South Dakota's policy rate with respect to efficiency and
equity criteria? The policy results in an all or nothing situation. If the
16. A well which "fully penetrates the aquifer" is one in which the bore of the well extends to
the impermeable strata underlying the actual water-bearing formation. When such water-bearing
formations are relatively thick, full penetration is often not essential to develop a reasonable well.
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affected well is "adequate," and interference is determined likely to occur,
use of water may be completely foreclosed, resulting in an efficiency loss
through the loss of real product that could have been produced with
irrigation. If the well is not adequate, and interference occurs, the results
are the same as in Figure 1, where production occurs to point q,, and
both efficiency and equity effects occur. There is a supra-optimal use of
resources, a resulting dead weight loss, and a transfer of income from
the owner of the affected well to the irrigator.
South Dakota also has a well-spacing requirement which is intended
to reduce interference problems. 17 All high capacity wells must be located
at least 660 feet from any domestic wells. This provision may have some
justification in that it precludes the worst possible cases of well interference.
Because the well-spacing rule is rather "cut and dried," it entails
relatively low administrative costs. Beyond this low-cost feature, however, the rule has few desirable effects. It does not prevent interference
with wells located more than 660 feet apart. While the requirement precludes the transfers and efficiency losses that would occur at distances
less than 660 feet, it also forecloses any production in cases where interference would not occur even at short distances due to natural hydrologic conditions. Little or no economic justification exists for such a
policy since it precludes the possibility of benefits to society from the
economic product which could be realized from irrigation. To the extent
that well interference can cause undesirable efficiency and equity effects,
efforts by policy-makers to reconcile those ill effects with the efficiency
gains from irrigation are certainly worthwhile.
3. Iowa
The impact of well interference as a political issue in the mid-1970's
was perhaps greater in Iowa than in any neighboring state. Public concern
about groundwater development led to a three year "near-moratorium"
on the issuance of new irrigation permits. Permits issued during this period
were limited to a term of one year.
At present, however, Iowa has no formal policy concerning well interference. Surprisingly, and in spite of the "near-moratorium" on irrigation permits, no Iowa statute or agency rules specifically mention the
well interference problem. The Iowa Natural Resource Council deals with
approximately ten cases of alleged interference each year on an ad hoc
basis.' 8 If there are indications that well interference is possible, the
17. S. D. COMp. LAws Tit. 46-6-6.1.
18. Interview with Louis Gieseke, Water Commissioner, Iowa Natural Resource Council, March
5, 1980.
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Council may deny permit applications on the grounds of inadequacy of
water supply. No formal investigation of the probability of occurrence is
made, however.
Where interference actually occurs, the parties involved are informally
urged to reach a private agreement. If the parties can't reach agreement,
the Council may investigate the complaint. Where investigation substantiates the interference, the Council may terminate the permit. No formal
mechanism exists for arbitration or determination of compensation. Although the Council can terminate the permit, it cannot order abatement
procedures or compensation. If either party to the dispute is dissatisfied
with the Council's actions, the only recourse is to proceed with litigation
under common law in the state courts. Such litigation generally is a viable,
although costly, alternative for the party damaged by interference. The
high degree of uncertainty associated with Iowa water permit procedures
may serve as a deterrent to groundwater use for irrigation and thus may
be the cause of efficiency losses. 19
Another component of Iowa's informal policy is that groundwater irrigation development has been effectively banned in many areas by moratoria on the issuance of new permits for a number of aquifers. The state
justifies this effective ban on the grounds of prevention of groundwater
mining. However, avoidance of well interference disputes was also a
factor in the development of this policy. 20
Iowa's informal approach to well interference problems has a number
of efficiency effects. The lack of a defined policy increases uncertainty
and acts as a disincentive to irrigation development. The resulting foregone production is an efficiency loss. The practice of limiting Council
involvement in the initial stages of permit disputes, combined with the
Council's sole option of permit suspension, has the effect of condoning
small transfers from the owners of domestic wells to irrigators . 2 1 In
addition, when interference is substantiated by the Council and permit
suspension threatened, the affected party holds a virtual veto power and
is able to extract a form of "monopoly rent" from that position, insofar
as the irrigator is forced to pay more than the actual damages incurred
in order to obtain consent to irrigate. Finally, litigation itself is costly.
The amount by which expenses of litigation exceed costs of alternative
methods of dispute resolution constitutes a dead weight loss to society.
Iowa's policy approach to well interference problems can be summa19. The general statutes concerning water allocation in Iowa are contained in 25 IOWA CODE
ANN. Ch. 455A (1971). At the time of writing of this article no agency rules had been enacted
governing the Natural Resource Council. The procedures outlined in this section were obtained from
Commissioner Gieseke, supra note 18.
20. Gieseke, supra note 18.
21. Id.
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rized as undefined and ad hoc. with heavy reliance on traditional legal
remedies through litigation. Such ad hoc policy involves apparent low
cost for the regulatory agency. However, it places the Council in the
unenviable position of making decisions regarding termination of existing
permits. The amounts of money at stake for the contending parties are
often substantial and the Council may be subject to both political pressure
and public vituperation. Moreover, to the extent that litigation results,
the system causes high transactions costs for the parties involved in
disputes.
In conclusion, Iowa's ad hoc approach produces indeterminate results,
involves high transaction costs, and causes considerable uncertainty, which
in turn operates as a formidable barrier to groundwater development and
use. The end results of this informal approach appear to be potentially
large losses in efficiency and an equity situation favoring those willing
and able to bear expenses of litigation.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The states of Minnesota, South Dakota, and Iowa have distinctly different approaches to the volatile problem of well interference. From the
standpoint of economic efficiency it is desirable to obtain the real gains
resulting from irrigation or other beneficial uses of water, and to prevent
the dead weight loss to society from supra-optimal use of resources,
consistent with reasonable transactions costs. The authors assert that wellconceived administrative regulations are far preferable to litigation in
terms of transactions costs. With respect to equity, the authors place a
high value on minimizing transfers from one party to another.
Analysis reveals that Minnesota law is efficient in permitting irrigation
and its resultant production. Dead weight losses from supra-optimal resouce use are unlikely because the irrigator must take marginal social
costs into account through the bargaining process with affected parties.
Income transfers, when they exist, are minimal because of the approximately equal bargaining power of the parties involved. Minnesota's relatively explicit administrative procedures and the incentive provided for
private parties to negotiate prior to irrigation minimize the chances of
costly and wasteful litigation.
Under South Dakota's policies, potential for efficiency losses exists
due to the 660 foot spacing law. In addition, possible impediments to
irrigation development arise where well interference is likely. The state
makes no provision for negotiation between affected parties. Dead weight
losses may occur if the well interfered with is considered "adequate."
Income transfers may occur when the well interfered with is legally
considered "inadequate" even though it was a safe and reliable water
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source prior to interference. Finally, preclusion of irrigation whenever an
"adequate" well is affected results in a loss of potential product to society.
Iowa's informal policies result in inefficiency due to the lack of formal
negotiation mechanisms prior to commencement of irrigation. Uncertainty
exists as to whether a permit, once issued, will remain in force. That
uncertainty serves in turn to impede development, while lack of negotiation procedures is likely to result in litigation.
As states in semi-arid regions develop well interference policies, policy
makers need to give greater attention to efficiency and equity considerations such as those discussed in this article. By examining the experiences
of states with diverse procedures, and comparing those varied approaches
with the tenets of economic theory, policy makers can foster potential
efficiency gains and equity effects which conform to the values of society.

d

MCs
f

i

oj

e

MC S'

0

b!

c

q2

q1

QUANTITY PUMPED
FIGURE 1

Economic Transfers and Losses Caused
by Well Interference

